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“Imperium in Imperio”: The
Corporation, Mining, and Governance
in British Southeast Asia, 1900–1930
DAVID BAILLARGEON
This article examines the history of mining in British Southeast Asia
during the early twentieth century. In particular, it focuses on the
histories of the Burma Corporation and the Duff Development Com-
pany, which were located in British-occupied Burma and Malaya,
respectively. It argues that despite being represented as “rogue” cor-
porate ventures in areas under “indirect” colonial rule, the contrasting
fates of each company—one successful, one not—reveal how foreign-
owned businesses operating in the empire became increasingly
beholden to British colonial state regulations during this period,mark-
ing a shift in policy from the “company-state”model that operated in
prior centuries. The histories of these two firms ultimately demon-
strate the continued significance of business in the making of empire
during the late colonial period, bridging the divide between the age of
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company rule and the turn toward state-sponsored “development”
that would occur in the mid-twentieth century.
Keywords: UK; colonialism; business-government relations; eco-
nomic development
Introduction
On June 5, 1930, the fiftieth annual Burma Dinner was held at the
stylish Connaught Rooms in central London. Sir Robert Horne, a
well-known Scottish businessman and former chancellor of the Exche-
quer, presided over the event and began festivities with the yearly
“prosperity to Burma” toast and speech. Horne’s focus that night was
commerce. After asserting that Burma’s exceptional growth in the
1920s had balanced the ongoing economic depression, Horne argued
that “India has been transformed by British people and British capital”
and that “we can talk of our exploitation of India with pride.” Horne’s
pride was likely unsurprising for those members of the Burma commu-
nity assembled in London. A member of Parliament for Glasgow Hill-
head since 1918, Horne was associated with Burma not through his
political connections but through his commercial interests. Horne was,
in fact, chairman of the Burma Corporation, a transnational mining
corporation that the businessman W. T. Howison would label in his
reply “one of the romances not only of Burma, but of the whole mining
world.” In his speech, Horne outlined his belief that British commerce
didnot just line thepockets of the “bloated representatives of thepeople
who have exploited Burma.” Instead, the MP thought that commerce
was crucial to the social, cultural, and moral development of the col-
ony, asking, “Where would India have been but for British capital to
develop her vast resources and set on foot her different schemes?”1
Horne’s remarks came at a significant moment in the history of
Britain, its empire, and its economy. Issued at a time when Britain’s
long-standing commitment to free trade was at its end, Horne’s missive
on the beneficence of commercial agents in British India captured his
optimism in the possibilities of a new economic age.2 His comments,
however, also hinted at a fundamental shift that had occurred over
the previous few decades; mainly, the transition from a belief in the
inherent separateness between the state and the economy to an
1. “The Burma Dinner,” Rangoon Gazette, June 16, 1930.
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understanding that the twowere closely linked.3 This transformation—
which, considering his own dual role as a politician and businessman,
Horne himself represented—signified a major change during the late
colonial period, particularly regarding the role of business and capital
in themaking of empire. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for
example, private corporations and individuals held sway over large
swaths of foreign land, often independent from the state. With their
claims of sovereignty legitimized by charters, treaties, and contracts,
the expansion of these private interests—which famously included the
British East India Company as well as “rogue empires” such as James
Brooke’s rule in Sarawak—not only preceded “official” colonial rule
but also provided a framework and justification for subsequent state-
directed occupation.4
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, this “company-state”
model would largely disappear. Although vestiges of the earlier system
remained, including the British North Borneo Company, a new empha-
sis on administrative centralization, border security, and state sover-
eignty made British officials reluctant to sanction such wide-ranging
powers to private enterprise.5 Nevertheless, commercial interests and
notions of “corporate governance” remained critical to imperial state
making in the early twentieth century.6 In locations across the British
Empire, the significance and reach of British and foreign-owned busi-
nesses only increased in scope over the late colonial period.7 The days
of company rule may have been over, but the business of empire was
better and more expansive than ever.8
This article focuses on the transformations of the early twentieth
century to assess how the often blurry relationship between the state
and the corporation evolved from the company-state model that
3. For a theory concerning this transition, see Polanyi, The Great Transforma-
tion.
4. See, e.g., Press, Rogue Empires; Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and
Empire; Stern, The Company-State. For a general overview of the legal history
approach to this subject, see Brewster and Stern, “Introduction to the Proceedings
of the Seminar on Corporations and International Law.”
5. On the British North Borneo Company, see Singh,TheMaking of Sabah.On
the end of the “rogue empire” model, see Press, Rogue Empires, 250.
6. On the idea of “corporate sovereignty” in India during this period, see
Raianu, “‘A Mass of Anomalies.’” For a theory concerning this concept more gener-
ally, see Barkan, Corporate Sovereignty.
7. British Malaya provides one prominent example. While the presence of
British and foreign-owned businesses was insignificant at the turn of the twentieth
century, the emergence and expansion of the tin and rubber industries led to a
profusion of corporate interests in the region by the 1930s and 1940s. See Allen
and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya.
8. For a history that examine the links between business and empire during the
late colonial period, see Rappaport, A Thirst for Empire.
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operated in earlier times.9 To do so, this paper utilizes a comparative
approach that examines the histories of two large-scale private enter-
prises active in Southeast Asia at this time: the Duff Development
Company in Malaya and the Burma Corporation in colonial Burma. A
multisited comparative study, this article shows, can reveal much
about the overlap between business and governance in the British
Empire during the early twentieth century. As Philippa Levine argues,
a comparative history that is attentive “to the interplay of local and
global” and to “rupture as well as commonality” can highlight broader
issues that travel across borders, contexts, and administrative regimes,
opening up new insights and avenues of inquiry at an imperial, global,
or transnational scale.10 Furthermore, a comparative history allows
scholars to engage more deeply with the local.11 Although many stud-
ies—such as Philip Stern’s influential history of the East India Com-
pany—examine the relationship between the corporation and the state
through a focus on the legal and juridical landscape that underwrote
that partnership, a place-based approach can show how a variety of
social, cultural, environmental, and spatial factors shaped how a com-
mercial enterprise developed in the local setting.12
A comparative approach attuned to notions of place and space also
presents an opportunity to locate different voices and source materials
in our studies of business and empire. This includes the views and
experiences of local political actors, laborers, engineers, managers, and
other foreign experts who inhabited these spaces, in addition to the
gentlemanly capitalists and metropolitan elites whose stories are often
told butwho rarely visited their sites of commerce.13 To provide amore
comprehensive narrative about how the Burma Corporation and the
Duff Syndicate evolved on the ground, this article incorporates a wide
range of sources that were either neglected or were unavailable in
9. On the role of the corporation in Britain and the British Empire during this
period, see Jones, Merchants to Multinationals; Wilkins, “The Free-Standing Com-
pany, 1870–1914”; Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy.
10. Levine, “Is Comparative History Possible?,” 347.
11. On the importance of scale as a narrative device, see White, “The National-
ization of Nature.”
12. Stern, The Company-State. For studies that similarly examine the relation-
ship between the corporation and the state through the lens of sovereignty and legal
history, see Raianu, “‘A Mass of Anomalies’”; Press, Rogue Empires; Fitzmaurice,
Sovereignty, Property and Empire.
13. Histories of the Burma Corporation, for instance, are nearly all filtered
through the lens of Herbert Hoover, who founded and chaired the company during
its early years. Hoover, however, only visited the site very briefly before World War
I. See, e.g., Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Engineer, 412–425. For a few
histories that specifically focus on the role of mining experts—foreign or otherwise
—in the British Empire, see Tuffnell, “Engineering Inter-Imperialism”; Arnold,
“Globalization and Contingent Colonialism.”
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previous decades, such as those found at the Department of National
Archives in Myanmar, the Arkib Negara Malaysia, and the recently
released colonial administration archives located at the National
Archives of theUnited Kingdom.14 Nevertheless, the fragmented archi-
val trail for each firm remains limited, valuing some voices more than
others. Although this article prioritizes the entanglements and tensions
that linked local company officials and British governmental agents in
Burma andMalaya, studies centered around the investing public or the
experiences of local indigenous leaders within these broader conver-
sations could reveal other important insights about the complex rela-
tionship maintained between the colonial state and private interests in
Southeast Asia during the early twentieth century. It is the former such
approach, however, that is the focus of this essay.
The histories of the Burma Corporation and the Duff Syndicate, this
article shows, provide a useful point of comparison to study the inter-
play between the state and the corporation in the British Empire. This is
because while each company evolved in a unique way and ultimately
had a different fate, together they shared a number of important features
that make a comparison valuable. Not only were both firms founded at
the turn of the twentieth century and celebrated publicly for their sup-
posed state-like qualities, but theywere also each located in areas under
“indirect” colonial rule in British Southeast Asia. Similarly, both com-
panies were, at least at their conception, mining ventures. Because
mining requiredaunique spatial fix to allow for large-scale development
and resource exploitation, the relationship crafted between the colonial
state and mining corporations was critical to success. Concerns about
land tenure, water, energy, communications, labor, sanitation, and
crime all impacted the development of a large-scale mining enterprise,
bringing any such operation into direct contact—and, at times, conflict
—with government.15 In areas distant from colonial state control, this
fact was only heightened. Owing to the infrastructure necessary for
development, mining firms had to navigate a complex array of policies,
legal codes, and rulers to expand their operations, a reality that became
even more regulated and convoluted over the early twentieth century.
This was, borrowing a phrase, a world of “layered sovereignties.”16
Nevertheless, as the divergent fortunes of the Duff Syndicate and the
BurmaCorporation indicate, the ability of private enterprise to dealwith
14. On the colonial administration archives, seeBadger, “Historians, a Legacyof
Suspicion and the ‘Migrated Archives.’”
15. For an example of this in a contemporary context, see Welker, Enacting the
Corporation.
16. On the concept of layered sovereignties, see Burbank and Cooper, Empires
in World History; Benton, A Search for Sovereignty. See also Stoler, “On Degrees of
Imperial Sovereignty.”
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and adapt to an increasingly interventionist state often meant the differ-
ence between success and failure in the British Empire during the early
twentieth century. Instead of acting outside the colonial administration
or on their own sovereign terms, businesses were incorporated within
the growing state apparatus, providing services and control in areas
where the state was weak, while simultaneously exploiting governmen-
tal policies to secure increased accessibility to land and profits. These
changes, however, did not proceed evenly or without resistance. Busi-
nessmen and colonial officials sparred on a litany of issues throughout
the late colonial period, particularly in reference to the rights of compa-
nies and the accessibility of land, energy, and communications.17 These
disagreements colored how the corporation developed as well as how
the state expanded its interests into areas under indirect rule. TheBurma
Corporation and the Duff Syndicate are representative of this. Both
conceived at the turn of the century, each firm struggled to adapt to
the new economic environment of the late colonial period, with ulti-
mately differing results. Their histories reveal how the relationship
crafted between the British colonial government and private enterprise
transformed in the early twentieth century. They also show how com-
mercial ventures remained central to themaking of the BritishEmpire in
the late colonial period, bridging the divide between the age of company
rule and the turn toward state-sponsored “development” in the mid-
twentieth century.18
The Case of the Burma Corporation
The mining operations at Bawdwin and Namtu were located in an area
known as the Northern Shan States of Burma during the colonial era
(see Figure 1). Bordering China and Siam in the northeast, the Shan
States were a collection of small autonomous states that, in the preco-
lonial period, enjoyed relative independence from Burmese rule.19
Bawdwin and Namtu, specifically, were situated in the state of Tawng-
peng, an area occupied and ruled by the Palaung ethnic group. Well
known for its tea production, Tawngpeng was also the site of consid-
erable industrial activity, a fact that emerged long before British
17. For an examination of these tensions in the Malayan context, see White,
“‘Ungentlemanly Capitalism.’”
18. On the developmental turn, see Cooper and Packard, International Devel-
opment and the Social Sciences; Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Devel-
opment; Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914 to
1940.
19. For a history of the Shan States, see Sao SaimongMangrai, The Shan States
and the British Annexation; Sai Aung Tun, History of the Shan State.
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colonial rule in the region.20 As early as the fifteenth century, Chinese
miners worked the surface of an ore deposit at Bawdwin, which held
Figure 1. Map of British Burma and the Bawdwin mines.
Source: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Herbert Hoover Pre-Commerce Files,
Subject: Mining, Burma Mines 1914.
20. On Tawngpeng, see Scott andHardiman,Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the
Shan States, 250–255.
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large concentrations of silver, lead, and zinc. At its height in the eigh-
teenth century, Bawdwinwas reported to have upward of twenty thou-
sand Chinese workers laboring at the site, making it one of the largest
and most significant mining enterprises in Asia.21 Despite this, and
likely owing to the outbreak of the Panthay Rebellion, the Chinese
abandoned the site in the mid-nineteenth century.22 It would remain
unworked until the turn of the twentieth century.
In the 1880s, British forces occupied and annexed Upper Burma,
concluding a series of violent confrontations and annexations that began
earlier in the century. At this time, the Shan States became an object of
interest for British officials as well as foreign businessmen, the latter of
whom saw vast economic potential in the region. Following a period of
anticolonial insurgency in the region that lasted into the 1890s, British
officials occupied and divided the Shan States into northern and south-
ern administrative units, utilizing a hybrid, indirect system of gover-
nance.23 In this system,a local sawbwa, or chief,was inchargeof lawand
order in his state, while a British superintendent was stationed in the
region to maintain peace and to ensure the proper and timely collection
of taxes. Although the presence of British officers in both the Northern
and Southern Shan States wasminimal, often representing only a hand-
ful of administrators, the territory was, in the view of the colonial gov-
ernment, sovereign British territory.24 This included the state of
Tawngpeng, where the Bawdwin mineral deposit was located.
Following the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886, it did not take long
for foreign capitalists to take notice of Bawdwin. Although legends about
the silvermines circulated in European circles since as early as the 1820s,
it was not until the 1890s that western businessmen first visited the area
and discovered the old Chinese workings at the site.25 In 1902, the Great
Eastern Mining Company—headed by a number of British agents—was
granted a lease to the Bawdwin concession, the first western company to
21. See Herbert Hoover Presidential Library (hereafter HHPL), Herbert Hoover
Pre-Commerce files, Subject: Mining, Burma Mines Reports, “Burma Mines, LTD.,”
report by Malcolm Maclaren, April 1913; Yang Yuda, “Silver Mines in Frontier
Zones,” 93. On the Chinese silver trade during this period, see Reid, “Chinese on
the Mining Frontier in Southeast Asia.”
22. Brown, “Geology and Ore Deposits of the Bawdwin Mines,” 126.
23. For a contemporaneous account of the anti-colonial resistance in the Shan
States, see Crosthwaite, The Pacification of Burma.
24. See Sao Saimong Mangrai, The Shan States and the British Annexation.
25. The first prospecting license was granted to A. C. Martin and the Sarkies
Brothers in 1898. See “The Rediscovery of Bawdwin Mines,” Rangoon Gazette,
December 4, 1916. On early European knowledge about Bawdwin, see Yule, A
Narrative, 308. On the first visit by a foreigner to the site in the post-annexation
years, see Lieutenant G.W. T. Prowse, “Report on theNorth-East Portion of theNorth
Theinni State,Mines at Bawdwingyi, and the Taungbain State, 1890,” in Department
of National Archives, Yangon, Myanmar, AG 15/2, acc. no. 18.
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hold mineral rights to the deposit.26 However, owing to a number of
developmental and financial difficulties, the venture was quickly forced
to recruit additional assistance. In 1903, the Share Guarantee Trust Lim-
ited, led by theAustralianR.TildenSmith, became involved in the firm.27
Then, in 1907, the BurmaMines Railway and Smelting Company—there-
after renamed Burma Mines Limited—was founded to take charge of the
nascent operations, merging Tilden Smith’s interests with those of a
number of other prominent figures in the British mining world.28 This
included the Australia-based management firm, Bewick, Moreing, and
Company, as well as the eminent American engineer and mining finan-
cier, Herbert Hoover. Hoover, despite only briefly visiting the mines,
became the primary leader of the enterprise during the first decade of
operations, recruiting and sending in his own team of engineers from the
UnitedStates andAustralia todevelop thesite.Althoughprogress initially
proved difficult, the company had a breakthrough in 1913 that allowed it
tomine deep below the surface for the first time, sparking the rise of large-
scale industrial lode mining at the site. Around the same time, the com-
pany reorganized itsmanagement structure and finances, founding a new
company—the Burma Corporation—to represent the enterprise.29 These
successes would jumpstart a new phase in Bawdwin’s history.
In the years following 1913, the operations at Bawdwin became one
of the most significant mining enterprises in the world. Although Hoo-
ver was forced out of the firm during World War I, the company
advanced rapidly into the 1920s and 1930s, when it became a symbol
of industrial success in the colony.30 Labeled with a litany of superla-
tives in the Anglo-Burmese press—including an “Industrial Wonder-
land” or the “Commonwealth of Namtu”—the mines, by the 1920s,
produced and shipped a significant amount of silver, lead, and zinc
for the world market, rivaling more famous counterparts in Western
Australia andNorth America.31 Located inwhat was often described as
a remote “jungle,” the mining venture was lauded for a number of its
26. National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter TNA), BT
31/10106/75693, Great Eastern Mining Company Ltd., files of dissolved companies.
27. Ansell, Richard Tilden Smith, 38–39.
28. British Library, India Office Papers and Public Records, Proceedings (here-
after Proceedings), P/7247, Department of Commerce and Industry (Revenue),
Burma, December 1906, lease of Bawdwingyi Mines to the Burma Mines Railway
and Smelting Co., Ltd.
29. On Hoover’s involvement with the firm, see Nash, The Life of Herbert
Hoover: The Engineer, 412–425. See also, TNA, BT 31/21753/131501, Burma Cor-
poration, Ltd., files of dissolved companies.
30. On Hoover leaving the firm, see Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Master of
Emergencies, 433–436.
31. See “Namtu: Burma’s Industrial Wonderland,” Rangoon Gazette, April
30, 1923; “Namtu and Bawdwin,” Rangoon Gazette, November 7, 1921.
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supposed achievements, including its use ofmodern technology and its
enlightened labor policies.32 For instance, after visiting the mines in
1927, Burma’s governor, Sir Harcourt Butler, noted that while “it is not
always realised that Burmaowes themainpart of its development to the
great firms and companieswhich have sunk… sums of capital” into the
province, the Burma Corporation’s feats demonstrated how “without
these firms and companies Burma would still be a backward country
instead of the progressive country that she is with a world-wide repu-
tation and fame.”33 Butler’s successor as governor, Sir Charles Innes,
similarly spoke of the significance of private capital to Burma’s devel-
opment. Visiting Bawdwin and Namtu in 1928, Innes asserted that
while he “heard many objections raised to the introduction of foreign
capital into India,” he wished that such critics “could be with me here
to-day and could see for themselves the benefits of the application of
capital, whether foreign or otherwise, to the development of an Eastern
country.”34 For both Butler and Innes, the mines demonstrated the
progressive capacities of private industry, a fact that both celebrated
the company’s achievements while also acknowledging the limitations
of government. The firm was, in other words, an exemplar of sound
corporate governance.
The public narrative that emerged in the 1920s about the Burma
Corporation may have celebrated the firm’s governing capacity, but
the reality on the ground was far more complicated. Although the
corporation adopted policies that would today be categorized under
the umbrella of “welfare capitalism,” theBritish colonial government in
Burma also played a critical role in the firm’s development and success,
a reality manifest from the very foundation of the venture.35 This is
because Bawdwin, legally speaking, was the protected property of the
British Crown. In the 1890s, when the British formalized their policy of
indirect rule in the Shan States, colonial administrators and Shan
leaders signed a “sanad”—or contract—that turned over all mineral
rights to the colonial government.36 Based on the Crown Rights system
used elsewhere in the British Empire at this time, the policy forced all
prospective firms to seek approval from the Anglo-Burmese
32. The area around Bawdwin was actually devoid of forests, a result of centu-
ries of Chinese mining at the site. For an example of the “jungle” trope, see Hoover,
The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 93.
33. “His Excellency at Namtu,” Rangoon Gazette, May 23, 1927.
34. “His Excellency’s Tour,” Rangoon Gazette, April 2, 1928.
35. On welfare capitalism, see Yacob, “Model of Welfare Capitalism?”.
36. Proceedings, P/4277, Revenue and Agricultural Department, Burma,
October 1893, Right of Imperial to revenue from minerals in the Shan States.
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government towork amineral deposit, irrespective of its location.37 For
the Burma Corporation’s predecessor, the Burma Mines Railway and
Smelting Company, this meant that the British state—and not local
authorities in Tawngpeng—authorized its lease. This lease, signed in
1906, officially sanctioned the relationship between the company and
government, solidifying both the taxes and royalties the firm was
expected to pay and the size of the concession.38 It also meant that
the Burma Corporation, despite operating in an area of indirect rule,
was still held accountable to British colonial laws and regulations.
The Bawdwin lease established the parameters for large-scale indus-
trial development at the site, but mining was a horizontal activity as
much as a vertical one. Even though the Burma Corporation and its
predecessors were legally sanctioned to extract ore at Bawdwin, the
spatial requirements of mining quickly forced the company to develop
additional areas outside the concession. Access to transportation, in
particular, was a central obstacle. Because the ore deposit was located
more than fifty miles from the nearest railway, the company required
the construction of an additional rail line to transport its commodities
to market. Understanding that the government was not in a position to
finance the railway’s construction, in 1908, the company instead peti-
tioned the government to support their own construction of the line, a
bid that was accepted. Thanks to the support of the Tawngpeng
sawbwa, who provided labor for the railway’s construction, the line
was finished in December 1909, linking Bawdwin with the state’s rail-
way service for the first time.39 Following this, in 1911, the company
smelter—located some 250 miles away in Mandalay—was relocated to
the nearby village of Namtu, allowing the firm to smelt ore locally.40
These advances, which were critical to the survival of the firm, made
possible the industrial development that would occur after the discov-
ery of the silver–lead–zinc deposit beneath Bawdwin in 1913. They
also began a process of expansion at Bawdwin and Namtu that would
accelerate in scale over the next two decades.
By the time of the establishment of industrial lode mining at Bawd-
win and Namtu in 1913, the Burma Corporation and its commercial
37. On the history and legal standing of the Crown Rights mineral policy, see
Alford, Mining Law of the British Empire.
38. Proceedings, P/7247, Department of Commerce and Industry, Burma,
December 1906, lease of Bawdwingyi to the Burma Mines Railway and Smelting
Co. Ltd.
39. British Library, India Office Papers and Public Records, Administration
Reports (hereafter Administration Reports), IOR/ V/10/532, “Report on the Admin-
istration of the Shan and Karenni States, for the year 1910–11.” On the Sawbwa’s
support, see Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 94.
40. See the 1911 report in HHPL, Pre-Commerce Papers, Subject: Mining,
Burma Mines Ltd. file.
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predecessors were bound to the colonial government in numerous
ways. In return for the granting of a mining lease, the company was
required to pay royalties to the Government of India, which included
both fixed royalties on working the site as well as any profits gained
from production. Owing to the large-scale industrial nature of the
enterprise, the firmwas also liable to additional taxes and supervision
from the colonial administration. The use of colonial railways—nec-
essary to ship large amounts of metals for export—was taxed at fixed
rates, and the building of infrastructure in the region—which included
the construction of the company railway, smelters, processing mills,
barracks, and other required mining machineries—only increased the
amount of land and leases the company required.41 Although small in
scale initially, by the 1920s, this infrastructure was considerable.
Nevertheless, the Burma Corporation required more than just a rail-
way and a handful of government contracts to ensure progress; the
company also needed to power its operations. To do so, the firm
needed large supplies of energy and labor, two “commodities” that
were in short supply in the Northern Shan States during this period.
These needs would spark both increasing disputes as well as signifi-
cant compromises between the company and government. They
would also lead to an increase in governmental oversight and regula-
tion in the region, expanding state interests along with those of the
Burma Corporation.
The growth of industrial activity at Bawdwin and Namtu enlarged
the footprint of foreign interests in the region, but for this to occur, the
BurmaCorporation required vast reserves of power and energy. Energy,
of course, was critical to the functioning of an industrial mining enter-
prise.Whether to powermachinery such as a processingmill or to assist
in pumping out groundwater from a mineshaft, mining work required
access to large supplies of natural resources to fuel its operations.42 At a
place like Bawdwin, located in an area of Burma distant from the
colonial state infrastructure, this presented aparticularly difficult prob-
lem. Coal, which was a preferred energy source for mining enterprises
at this time, was difficult to obtain in Burma, and shipping costs made
the import of the commodity prohibitive.43 As a replacement, the
41. On these various taxes and royalties, see Proceedings, P/8086, Department
of Commerce and Industry (Mines and Minerals), Burma, July 1909, Question as to
the procedure which may be adopted to check the collection of rents and royalties.
42. On changes in mining technology during this period, see Burt, “Innovation
or Imitation?”.
43. After World War I, the need for coal inspired the Burma Corporation to
pursue a deal with the Tata Iron and Steel Company to house a zinc-smelting
operation in India, which would be closer to Indian coal reserves. The agreement,
however, fell through. See London School of Economics and Political Science
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company was forced to rely on timber products. Although the area
directly surroundingBawdwinwas bereft ofwoodproducts—the result
of centuries of mining during the Chinese occupation of the site—the
company hired local Shan, Palaung, and Kachin villagers to cut wood
from the adjoining region.44 The need for timberwould, however, bring
the company into direct conflictwith the colonial government. Because
forestswere under the protection of the state, the clear-cutting of forests
frustrated colonial officials who were keen on conservation.45 To
account for the growing operations at Bawdwin, the government was
forced to increase the forest establishment numerous times, causing
tension between the two parties.46 In 1912, for example, it was reported
that unless additional forest agents could be sent to the Bawdwin area,
there would “be at the present rate of felling no forests left to reserve” in
four years.47 Evenwith the companypaying large royalties to fell timber
in the area, the company’s destruction of forests in the Northern Shan
States tempered the good relationship enjoyed between the corporation
and the colonial government.48 It also increased the need for state
employees in the area.
To solve the energy dilemma at Bawdwin, company officials turned
to another power source that, at least in theory, was available locally:
water. Like forest products, however, water access required the use of
additional land outside the company lease. In 1913, the company sent a
proposal to the government to build a power plant aboveMansamFalls,
located between Hsipaw and Lashio along the Nam Yao River, some
fifty miles distant from Bawdwin. In petitioning the government, the
BurmaCorporation argued that owing to the high costs of attaining both
oil and coal for the mines, as well as the issue of deforestation around
Bawdwin and Namtu, energy costs were excessively high and were
forcing the company to slow production. H. A. Thornton, the superin-
tendent of the Northern Shan States, found the company’s proposal to
Archives, Selection Trust Archives, SELECTION TRUST/ACB/126, 1918 director’s
report; British Library, India Office Papers and Public Records, Industries and Over-
seas Department Papers, IOR/L/E/7/1213, file 667, Burma Corporation.
44. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/532, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States for the Year Ended the 30th June 1912.”
45. The government introduced policies on forest conservation and royalties in
Tawngpeng in 1910. Administration Reports, IOR/ V/10/532, “Report on theAdmin-
istration of the Shan and Karenni States, for the year 1910–11.”
46. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/532, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States for the Year Ended the 30th June 1912.”
47. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/532, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States for the Year Ended the 30th June 1913.”
48. On timber royalties, see Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/532, “Report on
the Administration of the Shan and Karenni States for the Year Ended the 30th June
1912.”
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be a “sound one” and believed that the high costs of fuel and, in par-
ticular, the “very great and permanent damage being done to the for-
ests” near the mines were worthy reasons to grant a license to the
company. Thornton’s primary concern with allowing the company to
build the plant was the possibility that “the beauty of the landscape at
and near the Falls may be spoiled.” This “sentimental” reason, how-
ever, did not “override the practical benefit which will be secured both
to theGovernment and theCompany,” andThornton recommended the
government to issue an approval to the firm. The lieutenant-governor
agreedwith Thornton, butwith an added caveat. Becausewaterways in
the Shan States were not under the same rules that applied to mineral
resources, the company had to consult with the “Sawbwas of the States
concerned” regarding the “terms on which the water rights and land
required in connection therewith should be leased to the Company.”
Once that had been completed, along with surveying and building
estimates, the company could apply to the local government for per-
mission to the use the falls.49
The colonial administration may have supported the Burma Corpo-
ration’s proposal to build a hydroelectric power plant at Mansam Falls,
but unlike other company-built engineering projects that occurred on
site, the Mansam Falls project languished in development for years.
This occurred because the companywas unable to strike a dealwith the
local sawbwas—in this case, fromHsipaw and the North Hsenwi States
—in regard to royalties, amatter the colonial administrationwas unable
to solve.50 Believing that the sawbwas were asking for too much in the
way of royalties, the company tabled the project, instead proposing a
number of alternate schemes. In 1919, for instance, the company pro-
posed to block an area of theNamYaoRiver and build a large lake in the
region to “fill the shortage of the food supply” around Namtu. The
government, however, denied the request, citing that “the conflict
between the interests of the Company and the permanent population
will necessitate very careful consideration of the problems involved
before anydecision ought to be taken.”51Nevertheless, inMay1920, the
company’s original plan was finally approved. Under the supervision
of a government officer, the Burma Corporation and the sawbwas of
Hsipaw and the North Hsenwi States signed a lease that gave the
49. Proceedings, P/9120, Department of Commerce and Industry (Mines and
Minerals), Burma, January 1913, application of the Burma Mines, Limited, for per-
mission to use water from the Nam-Yao river for electric power.
50. Proceedings, P/9901, Department of Commerce and Industry (Mines and
Minerals), Burma, December 1916, application of the Burma Mines Ltd for permis-
sion to use water.
51. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/533, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States for the Year Ended the 30th June 1918.”
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company permission to the build a hydroelectric power plant at Man-
sam Falls, solving the royalty issue that had plagued negotiations since
1913.52 By September 1920, the plant was completed, not only provid-
ing a new and significant source of energy for the mining operations,
but also extending the reach of the company well beyond Bawdwin’s
location in Tawngpeng.53
The Mansam Falls project was eventually resolved in favor of the
Burma Corporation, but the frustrations of the experience induced
the firm to ask the colonial government for increased assistance in
the region. In 1916, when the company’s proposal was still in limbo,
the Burma Corporation petitioned the government to reorganize the
administration of the area and wrest control from the Tawngpeng
Sawbwa. The government was reluctant to take such a step. H. A.
Thornton, the superintendent of the Northern Shan States during this
time, responded that he “would deprecate any proposals” to “withdraw
the tract inwhich the Company is operating from the jurisdiction of the
Sawbwas,”which would “not only be unjust, but impolitic to the high-
est degree.” Instead, Thornton recommended that an assistant superin-
tendent, whowould live on site at Namtu, should replace the adviser to
Tawngpeng. Although Thornton understood that it was an undesirable
time to add “to the cost of administration in the Northern Shan States,”
the company was on “so large a scale” that the government could not
wait until the end of the war. “The control of the tract in which it
operates is so rapidly becoming more and more difficult,” Thornton
noted, “that the establishment which was barely sufficient to adminis-
ter the States before the Companywas heard of is absolutely inadequate
now.”54 A few months later, in December 1916, the government
approved Thornton’s proposal, and the first assistant superintendent
at Namtu took up his post at the mines.55 This position, which would
further entangle the interests of the company and the colonial govern-
ment, would remain in place until decolonization.56
The Burma Corporation’s energy crisis reveals how the company
became increasingly subject to local and governmental regulations over
52. Proceedings, P/10810, Department of Commerce and Industry (Mines and
Minerals), Burma, May 1920, Burma Mines Limited, application for permission to
use the Nam-yao river.
53. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/533, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States for the Year Ended the 30th June 1921.”
54. Proceedings, P/9907, Political Department, Burma, July 1916, appointment
of anAssistant Superintendent to be stationed at Namtu in the Northern Shan States.
55. Proceedings, P/9907, Political Department, Burma, December 1916,
appointment of an Assistant Superintendent at Namtu in the Northern Shan States
56. The letters of one such government official, H. O. P. Evans, are preserved at
the British Library. See British Library, India Office Papers and Public Records,
Papers of H. O. P. Evans, Indian Civil Service, Burma (1933–1940), mss. Eur D934.
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the early twentieth century, but the surge in population at the site
presented a number of other complications. Although initially a small
operation, by the 1920s, the mines housed thousands of workers annu-
ally, most of whom had traveled to Bawdwin from India and China.57
Because the region was not accustomed to a large population, the
company was forced to provide many amenities to support its diverse
workforce, including living quarters, a company-built store, and an
assortment of leisure activities. The need for sanitation, however,
became a point for concern. Between 1912 and 1919, a number of out-
breaks of disease occurred at the site, including cholera and influenza.
The constant threat of malaria, as well as a significant number of inju-
ries and deaths caused by industrial mining work, accompanied these
epidemics.58 To combat these problems, the Burma Corporation, in
concert with government, set up quarantines in the region surrounding
the mines. The company also began a new policy of forced hygiene,
forcing workers to undergo lice inspections and to take “regular
baths.”59 These temporary measures, however, soon made way for a
more long-term solution. In 1922, and with the support of the colonial
government, the company completed construction on a hospital in
Namtu. The hospital, which was designed to service not only mine
workers but also members of the local community, became one of
Burma’s largest health facilities in the late colonial period. It also
became a symbol of the company’s supposedly beneficent rule in the
Northern Shan States.60
Questions relating to land, energy, and sanitation all coalesced into
an increasing governmental presence in the area around Bawdwin and
Namtu, but law and orderwas also a concern. Although the area around
Bawdwin had minimal police presence at the start of the century, the
rising population in the region brought with it an influx of crime. To
combat this problem, and beginning in 1908, the superintendent of the
Northern Shan States ordered a large increase in the region’s police
force, a change financed jointly by the company, the government, and
57. On the diversity of workers at the mines, see British Library, India Office
Papers and Public Records, Committee and Commission Reports, IOR/V/26/670/25,
Labour in India Royal (Whitley) Commission 1929–1931: Evidence, Vol. 10, Burma,
London, 1931 (hereafter Whitley Commission).
58. On the cholera outbreak, see Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/532,
“Report on the Administration of the Shan and Karenni States, for the year ended
the 30th June 1913.” On influenza, see Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/533,
“Report on the Administration of the Shan and Karenni States, for the year ended
the 30th June 1919.”
59. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/533, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States, for the year ended the 30th June 1921.”
60. J. P. Cullen, “Medical and Sanitary Work with the Burma Corporation.”
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the local Sawbwas.61 Manpower, however, was only one way the gov-
ernment policed behavior. Starting in 1920, the British administration
applied a litany of legislative acts to the Northern Shan States, includ-
ing the Burma Criminal Law Amendment Act as well as the Indian
Factories Act.62 The latter act forced the company to report on a variety
of labor-related concerns for the first time, including the annual size of
the workforce, the number of hours worked, and most importantly, the
details of accidental injuries and deaths that occurred on the mines’
premises.63 Additionally, the company became subject to visiting labor
commissions.64 In 1929, for instance,members of theWhitley Commis-
sion visited Bawdwin andNamtu as part of a larger project to supervise
industrial enterprises across British India. These forms of government
surveillance brought labor concerns to the forefront of colonial efforts
to police and regulate industrial activity in the region. They also forced
the company to answer questions about its labor policies for the first
time, bringing the governance of its large workforce more firmly under
the supervision of the colonial state.65
In addition to the many changes that occurred on the ground at
Bawdwin and Namtu, the Burma Corporation’s financial andmanage-
ment model was also forced to adapt to colonial state intervention.
Although the firm was initially operated and chaired by a host of
foreign businessmen—including, significantly, the American finan-
ciers Herbert Hoover andArthur Chester Beatty—the company’s man-
agement team increasingly came to reflect imperial priorities
throughout the late colonial period.66 Between 1915 and 1916, for
example, the company appointed two officials active in Burma and
India—Sir Hugh Barnes, the former lieutenant governor of Burma, as
well as Sir Trevredyn Wynne, former president of the Railway Board
of India—to its board of directors. Wynne, in particular, became an
important addition to theBurmaCorporation’smanagement team, and
61. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/532, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States for the Year Ended the 30th June 1913.”
62. Administration Reports, IOR/V/10/532, “Report on the Administration of
the Shan and Karenni States, for the year ended the 30th June 1921”; Administration
Reports, IOR/V/10/532, “Report on the Administration of the Shan and Karenni
States, for the year ended the 30th June 1922”; British Library, India Office Papers
and Public Records, Departmental Annual Reports, IOR/V/24/1655, “Annual Report
on the Working of the Indian Factories Act, 1911, in Burma for the Year 1920.”
63. The Indian Factories Act went into force in lowland Burma in 1912, and in
the Shan States in 1920. Departmental Annual Reports, IOR/V/24/1655, “Annual
Report on theWorking of the Indian FactoriesAct, 1911, in Burma for theYear 1912.”
64. The British administration in Malaya also became increasingly concerned
with labor issues at this time. See Lees, Planting Empire, Cultivating Subjects.
65. See the Whitley Commission.
66. On the career of Arthur Chester Beatty, see Wilson, The Life & Times of Sir
Alfred Chester Beatty.
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the company saw his appointment as an important step in building
better relations between the firm and the government.67 By the 1920s,
these connections were further solidified. In 1923, and in an effort to
create a British imperial zinc-smelting industry, a coalition of some of
the British Empire’s most important mining financiers became the
primary shareholders of the Burma Corporation. The reorganized
company, led by the Australian business magnate W. S. Robinson,
brought in a number of well-connected British commercial agents,
including Sir Cecil Budd and Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos)
from the British Metal Corporation, William Baillieu of the Zinc Cor-
poration, and Sir Robert Horne, a former chancellor of the Exchequer
in Britain.68 Horne, who was a prominent figure in the global silver
trade, became the chairman of the company in the 1920s and 1930s,
speaking at company functions and promoting the company’s inter-
ests in metropolitan Britain.69 These changes in the firm’s ownership
group sparked a new phase in the Burma Corporation’s history, bring-
ing the company more directly into the control of government in a
post–free trade era.
The success of the Burma Corporation reveals how, even in areas
under indirect colonial rule, private enterprise was beholden to gov-
ernmental oversight in the early twentieth century. Although osten-
sibly a story of industrial achievement and sound corporate
governance, the firm’s history instead demonstrates how the
company-state model of the preceding centuries evolved at this time,
as well as how the interests of business and government increasingly
intersected. Success in this environment, however, was never
assured. Without constant adaptation and compromise on the part
of both company and state, the ability of private enterprise to prosper
in areas under indirect rulewas always in peril. These dangers would
confront one other mining firm in Southeast Asia at this time: the
Duff Development Company in BritishMalaya. Located in the largely
autonomous state of Kelantan, the story of the Duff Syndicate
uncovers the difficulties and waning viability of private administra-
tion in the British Empire during the late colonial period. It also
shows how the “rogue empire” era of corporate governance made
67. See the Burma Corporation Ltd. Shareholders Meeting report from 1915 in
HHPL, Pre-Commerce Papers, Subject: Mining, Burma Corp Ltd. file.
68. Cocks and Walters, A History of the Zinc Smelting Industry in Britain, 45–
54. See also Lyttelton, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos; Murphy, “Lyttelton, Oliver,
first Viscount Chandos.”
69. For examples of his speeches, see “Editorial,” Rangoon Gazette, March
16, 1925; “Burma Corporation, Ltd.: Annual General Meeting,” Rangoon Gazette,
January 3, 1927; “The Burma Dinner,” Rangoon Gazette, June 16, 1930.
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way for a new regulatory system of state supervision in the colonial
setting, one that was not always embraced by its commercial agents.
The Case of the Duff Development Company
The Duff Development Company, also known as the Duff Syndicate,
was created in 1900. Named after its founder, the former British colo-
nial official R. W. Duff, the firm’s operations were based in the state of
Kelantan, located on the east coast of the Malayan Peninsula (see
Figure 2). Kelantan, at the time of the company’s founding, was inde-
pendent from British colonial rule. Situated between Siam and the
British-occupied Federated Malay States, Kelantan was governed by
Figure 2. Map of the Duff Development Company concession in Kelantan,
ca. 1908.
Source: W. A. Graham, Kelantan: A State of the Malay Peninsula (Glasgow: James Macle-
hose and Sons, 1908).
History of Mining in British Southeast Asia 19
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.49
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 146.200.209.254, on 22 Oct 2020 at 08:25:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
a local raja, who passed laws, levied taxes, and promoted local cus-
toms.70 Although this meant that the state was self-governing, a period
of political turmoil in the 1890s threatened the area’s autonomy. Fol-
lowing an outbreak of anticolonial violence in the neighboring state of
Pahang, which had only recently become a British protectorate, rebels
fled into Kelantan and were pursued by British troops. The rebellion,
though quickly subdued, brought British forces into the region for the
first time.71 This included the British advisor to Pahang, Hugh Clifford,
as well as Pahang’s superintendent of police, the latter of whom
recognized the area’s significant economic potential. That man was
R. W. Duff.72
Expanding British interests in the region prompted R. W. Duff’s first
visit to Kelantan, but at least initially, British officials in Malaya were
uninterested in permanent administration. Although a local leadership
struggle among Kelantan elites in the 1890s played on British and
Siamese interests in the region, the British government remained neu-
tral into the twentieth century so as to avoid a broader geopolitical
conflict.73 Nevertheless, R. W. Duff saw an opportunity. In 1900, Duff
retired from the British colonial civil service and brokered a deal with
the raja ofKelantan to attain a concession in the state.74 Thedeal, signed
inOctober 1900, providedDuff and his firm the rights to three thousand
square miles of land as well as “all commercial rights of every kind
mining and otherwise within the area of [the] concession.”75 For his
part, the raja received a cash payment as well as shares in the com-
pany.76 The deal, however, was highly controversial. Because the deed
effectively made Duff a “sovereign” power “even more independent”
than “Brooke of Sarawak,” as the historian K. G. Tregonning later
referred to it, the situation was troubling for Britain and Siam alike.77
While Siam was concerned that a British agent—particularly a former
colonial official—held such unconstrained power in a territory it con-
sidered its own, the British were equally anxious about Duff’s
70. Siam, it should be noted, long considered Kelantan to be part of its own
territory. On Kelantan’s turbulent political history at this time, see Talib, History of
Kelantan 1890–1940, 17–59.
71. For a history of the rebellion, see Linehan, “A History of Pahang”; Clifford,
Report of an Expedition into Trengganu and Kelantan in 1895.
72. On Duff’s story, see LeVos, “Robert W. Duff.”
73. This intrigue, as well as the complex history of Anglo-Siamese negotiations
about Kelantan, is best summarized in Talib,History of Kelantan 1890–1940, 37–59;
Robert, “The Duff Syndicate in Kelantan 1900–1902,” 83.
74. See Talib, History of Kelantan 1890–1940, 20–21.
75. Arkib Negara Malaysia (hereafter ANM), 2007/0007684, Duff Development
Company Limited, correspondence letters, 1901–1916 (hereafter Duff Correspon-
dence), letter fromunknown author to the chairman of the Duff Syndicate Ltd., 1902.
76. Wright and Reid, The Malay Peninsula, 157.
77. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 239.
20 BAILLARGEON
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2020.49
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 146.200.209.254, on 22 Oct 2020 at 08:25:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
intentions and the potential fallout from his behavior.78 Nonetheless,
and following a protracted period of negotiation, both parties agreed to
the validity of Duff’s claim. Additionally, in 1902, Siam, Britain, and
Kelantan agreed on a treaty that asserted Siam’s control over the state,
with the added compromise that a British officer—W. A. Graham—
would be sent to act as an official advisor.79 Graham would play a
significant political role in Kelantan throughout the Duff Development
Company’s early years.80
When the Duff Development Company was founded in 1900, the
firm’s commercial interests were diverse. The concession, which
encompassed nearly a third of the landmass of Kelantan, provided
access to a variety of economic pursuits, including timber extraction
and land for farming and estate cultivation. Yet, at its inception, the
company was primarily positioned as a mining venture.81 In 1902,
correspondence from within the firm noted that while the company
held “an immense tract of countrywith almost unlimited possibilities,”
the mineral wealth of Kelantan would “naturally be the first consider-
ation which will appeal to the shareholders.” Though not an engineer
himself, Duff recruited a number of geologists and mining experts to
advise him on the mineral possibilities of the region, including Walter
Chappell, Robert Swan, and a Mr. Indir.82 Based on their reports, Duff
concluded that the area contained large deposits of gold and silver, the
former of which became the firm’s primary interest. According to
reports from the period, Swan was “of [the] opinion that what gold is
to be won in the Malaya Peninsula” was found in one particular slate
wall, “and our concession contains this slate from end to end.”83 In
addition, Duffwas advised that the rivers inKelantanwere gold bearing
and suitable for dredging operations, a new technology at this time.84
78. At the time,Duffwas also unclearwhether or not the Siamese government or
the raja held the sovereign rights to Kelantan. See Wright and Reid, The Malay
Peninsula, 153–157.
79. Talib, History of Kelantan 1890–1940, 51–59.
80. On Graham’s impact, see ibid., 61–103.
81. For a history that examines the relationship between mining and indirect
rule in Malaya, see White, Barwise, and Yacob, “Economic Opportunity and Strate-
gic Dilemma in Colonial Development.”
82. Chappell, a mining engineer from Cornwall, later became one of Malaya’s
leading tin-mining magnates. Swan worked for the Wallace Brothers, and Indir is
noted as being an expert on dredging technology in New Zealand. See ANM, Duff
Correspondence, letter from unknown author to the chairman of the Duff Syndicate
Ltd., 1902. On Walter Chappell, see Palmer and Joll, Tin Mining in Malaysia, 1800–
2000.
83. ANM, Duff Correspondence, letter from unknown author to the chairman of
the Duff Syndicate Ltd., 1902.
84. On the history of dredging in Southeast Asia, seeHillman,The International
Tin Cartel, 39–41.
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Nevertheless, the company remained cautious. Though correspon-
dence noted that the firm was working to ascertain the value of the
property’smineral reserves, the size of the concessionmade such a task
slow and difficult. “The result of these operations,” one report summa-
rized, would “furnish just so much information as to the value of the
property as would result from counting the coin in the hands of a bank
cashier if one were seeking to ascertain the capital of the bank.”85
Despite his restraint, Duff remained optimistic about the company’s
prospects during its early years. With the earlier political difficulties
“entirely removed,” and because its commercial rights were “more
generous” than the conditions “on which any similar rights have ever
been worked before,” Duff felt that the significant value of the property
was nearly assured.86 Nevertheless, there were complications.
Although the company quickly moved to develop the region—which
included the commencement of gold-dredging operations, rubber
planting, and the construction of a sawmill—progress proved slow,
and the company continuously operated at a loss.87 In addition, the
relationship between the company and the government of Kelantan
produced considerable tension. Because the firmwas reluctant to relin-
quish any rights to their territory, Kelantan’s government—particularly
the British advisor to the government, W. A. Graham—became con-
cerned about a number of problems, especially over import duties and
land tenure for indigenous inhabitants within the concession.88 To
remedy the situation, and under Graham’s supervision, Duff and the
raja of Kelantan compromised on a new contract signed in 1905. The
contract forced the firm to cede some of its independence in exchange
for the granting of various monopolies. This not only included monop-
olies on items such as mineral rights, farming, and timber, but also the
sole rights to promote the construction of roads and railways within
the concession. These railways rights, despite being one small aspect of
the negotiations, became a central concern for the company in the
ensuing years.89
Between 1905 and 1909, the Duff Development Company continued
to flounder. While its concerns in timber, farming, and rubber planting
85. ANM, Duff Correspondence, letter from unknown author to the chairman of
the Duff Syndicate Ltd., 1902.
86. Ibid.
87. On impatient shareholders at this time, see “Duff Development,” Singapore
Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (Weekly), November 25, 1905.
88. On Duff’s many complaints about Graham’s tenure during this period, see
TNA, FO 628/27/310, memorandum by Mr. R. W. Duff replying to Mr. Beckett’s
letter, August 1906.
89. ANM, 1997/0005253, Agreement between Raja of Kelantan and The Duff
Development Company Limited, dated 24th Rabialawal 1323. See also Kaur and
Robert, “The Extractive-Colonial Economy and the Peasantry,” 59.
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showed signs of promise, a fierce and ongoing dispute with W. A.
Grahamover issues such as land lawswithin the concession threatened
the ability of the company to expand its operations.90 In addition, the
firm’s primary economic interest—industrial mining—stalled in devel-
opment. Gold dredging, which brought in some income during this
period, produced lowyields, and the firm’smost encouraging prospect-
ing site—a large mineral deposit at an area named Liang Camp—was
located in a remote part of the concession.91 The state of transportation
in the concession was a particularly vexing issue. Although company
engineers and foreign mining experts who visited Liang Camp were
convinced about the deposit’s vast potential—even sinking a number of
shafts and importing boilers to the site—the mines were located in
dense jungle far from existing modes of transport.92 Local waterways,
which the company initially hoped could sustain the business, quickly
became untenable for the transit of machinery, owing to both high costs
and unreliable service.93 A solution, however, never materialized.
Between 1903 and 1906, the company sent a series of appeals to both
the Siamese and Kelantan governments to assist in the construction of
railways to service the area, but their offerswere rejected.94 In 1908, and
with frustrations at their peak, the chairman of the company—the
mining magnate, Francis Osborne—as well as the chief mining engi-
neer—John Taylor Marriner—resigned from the company, the latter
owing specifically to his dissatisfaction with the situation at Liang
Camp.95 The mines were subsequently abandoned.96
90. See TNA, FO 628/27/310, memorandum by Mr. R. W. Duff replying to
Mr. Beckett’s letter, August 1906.
91. In October 1907, e.g., Duff reported that the company’s dredges were “very
poor” and only produced £17,000worth of gold in the preceding eightmonths. ANM,
Duff Correspondence, R. W. Duff to Francis Osborne, October 4, 1907.
92. According to the geologist, Professor John Walter Gregory, the ore was
similar to that found in Leadville, Colorado, and represented a highly valuable
proposition. See John Walter Gregory interview in TNA, FCO 141/16701, “In the
Arbitration between the Duff Development Company, Limited and the Government
of Kelantan and in the Matter of the Arbitration Act, 1889” (hereafter Arbitration).
93. The company was especially frustrated with the slow speed of river trans-
port aswell as issues such as lowwater during the dry season,monsoon flooding, and
shifting sandbanks. See ANM, 2007/0007580, Duff Development Company Limited,
“Note on Mining Claim Four Main Points and Notes on Transport, 1912.” On the
company’s steamer services, see Graham, Kelantan: A State of the Malay Peninsula,
55–57, 129.
94. This included a1903proposal to the raja of Kelantan and a series of petitions
in 1906 to the Siamese government. For the 1903 proposal, see Talib, History of
Kelantan 1890–1940, 93–94. For the 1906 proposals, see, e.g., TNA, FO 371/182,
letter from Mr. Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, September 12, 1906.
95. On Osborne’s resignation, see ANM, Duff Correspondence, R. W. Duff to
Francis Osborne, March 26, 1908. On the reasons for Marriner leaving the firm, see
his interview in TNA, FCO 141/16701, Arbitration.
96. See Marriner’s interview in TNA, FCO 141/16701, Arbitration.
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By 1908, the Duff Development Company was in a dire position.
With the company’s mining work in disarray and its rubber prospects
still developing, R. W. Duff reported to the British government that the
company held only £12,000 in working capital and was in danger of
going out of business.97 Nevertheless, Duff remained hopeful. In 1908,
Siam and Britain agreed to a deal to cede the rights over Kelantan to the
British colonial government, an agreement that was officially sanc-
tioned in 1909.With the deal, Kelantan became part of the Unfederated
Malay States, a collection of territories that were administered under
indirect British colonial rule.98 Duff, for his part, welcomed the agree-
ment. In a letter to the secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Crewe,
Duff noted his “satisfaction” over the new deal, adding that the com-
pany would “loyally co-operate” with the government “in aiding the
administration of the State.”99 Duff reinforced these views in public. At
the company’s annual meeting in 1909, the founder expressed his
“confidence” in the agreement, believing that “under British rule any
capital invested in Kelantan would be properly safeguarded.” Even
still, Duff knew that the firm would need to reach a compromise with
the new British administration regarding the company’s extensive
rights. With new regulations and a fresh administrative regime in the
region, Duff understood that the company’s fate depended on main-
taining a stable relationship with the colonial government, who he
anticipated would finally provide the support necessary for large-scale
development.100 These hopes would never come to fruition.
The 1909 deal ushered in a new era for the Duff Development Com-
pany, but despite its promising start, conflict ultimately defined the
relationship between the firm and the new administration. This
occurred for a variety of reasons. The first issue involved the rights
the company secured under the 1905 agreement with the raja of Kelan-
tan. In 1909, the governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir JohnAnderson,
told R.W. Duff that the company’s rights “were such as ought only to be
exercised by Government” and that their continuance would “lead to
friction between the Government and the Company to the detriment of
both.” The government was particularly concerned about the indeter-
minate size of the concession, the company’s privileges of taxation, and
their farming monopolies. Starting in 1909, Anderson and Duff began
negotiations on a deal that would have seen the company surrender
97. TNA, FCO 141/15894, R. W. Duff to the under secretary of state for foreign
affairs, June 16, 1908.
98. On the various systems of administration in Malaya under British occupa-
tion, see Emerson,Malaysia.On Kelantan’s government, see Talib,History of Kelan-
tan 1890–1940, 105–158.
99. TNA, FCO 141/15891, R. W. Duff to Lord Crewe, April 21, 1908.
100. “The Duff Development Co. (Ltd.),” Times (UK), March 23, 1909.
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certain rights formonetary compensation, but the two parties could not
agree on a price and the talks were tabled.101 Another major problem
involved railway extensions. In March 1909, at the same time the
Anglo-Siamese agreement was passed, the British government in
Malaya also brokered a deal with Siam to loan the country
£4,000,000 to build a railway connecting Singaporewith Bangkok. This
railway, which was designed to pass directly through the Duff conces-
sion inKelantan,would have connected the firm’s operations by rail for
the first time. Duff, however, rebuffed the proposal. Arguing that under
the 1905 lease, the company alone had the rights to construct roads and
railways in the concession, Duff believed that the deal violated the
company’s rights and could only be sanctioned once the government
and the company agreed to a deal. A deal, for Duff, meant considerable
financial compensation.102
Many British officials in Malaya were supportive of the Duff Devel-
opment Company and lauded its efforts in the region, but the negotia-
tions between the company and the government proved combative.103
Nevertheless, in 1912, the two parties agreed to a new contract—
labeled the “Deed of Cancellation”—that engendered immense changes
for the firm. As part of the deal, the company agreed to surrender much
of its concession—down to fifty thousand acres—as well as its railway
rights in exchange for £300,000 and a commitment from the govern-
ment that itwould finance andbuild a cart road and railway through the
Duff concession. The railway, which the company hopedwould finally
allow for industrial development in the region, was the fulcrum of the
deal. Once the government agreed to the path of the railway, the com-
pany then had twelve months to select the blocks of lands they would
keep. The government, for its part, had until July 1916 to construct the
road and railway. Therewas, however, amajor problem. AlthoughDuff
thought the government would build the line directly through the old
concession, passing near the mineral deposit at Liang Camp as well as
the company’s principal rubber estates, government surveyors pro-
posed an alternate route that bypassed that area entirely. Duff, incensed
by the change in plans, argued that this represented a breach in
101. Duff asked for £350,000, but Anderson would only agree to £43,000, which
represented the capitalized value of the company’s revenue. See TNA, CO 1073/133,
memorandum, “History of the Affairs of the Duff Development Company 1900–
March, 1923.”
102. Ibid.
103. Both Sir John Anderson and the British minister to Siam, Ralph Paget,
supported the company. In an effort to broker goodwill with Duff, e.g., Anderson
replacedGrahamwith a newBritish advisor toKelantan—J. S.Mason—following the
1909 agreement. On Paget’s pro-Duff sentiments, see TNA, FO 628/26/300, letter
from Ralph Paget to W. A. Graham, January 13, 1905. On Anderson’s actions, see
Talib, History of Kelantan 1890–1940, 107.
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contract.104 In response, the company entered into arbitration hearings
with the government in 1915 to ascertain the potential damagesmade to
the firm’s financial standing, a hearing that was decided in favor of the
local government. Duff, for his part, was not satisfied. Beginning in
1918, the firm once again entered into legal negotiations with the gov-
ernment, a process that lasted for the next seven years.105 This time,
Duff won. In 1925, a British court ruled that the Kelantan government
was liable to pay theDuff Development Company £378,000 in damages,
a number that was arrived at largely due to the estimated earnings and
royalties the company lost from its mining concerns.106 Ultimately, the
railway through Kelantan would not be finished until the early
1930s.107
The 1923 court ruling represented a moment of victory for Duff, but
despite the enormous financial windfall that accompanied it, the com-
pany never attained the measure of success it hoped for. Although the
firm transitioned its commercial pursuits into timber and rubber and
remained active throughout the late colonial period, the company’s
work as a mining venture represented a significant failure.108 For Duff,
the source of this failure was the British colonial government. Speaking
to company shareholders in 1916, Duff argued that thewhile “therewere
no Imperial or other great interests which clashed with their own,” the
government would be “failing in their duty to the company if they
allowed their rights to be taken from them without fair compensation.”
Duff believed that the companywas a “pioneer” inMalaya. Not only did
they arrive and secure British interests before the colonial occupation of
Kelantan, but they also “rendered services to British commercial inter-
ests generally in the country.” In return, Duff believed that the company
“might not unreasonably look” for “sympathy and whole-hearted assis-
tance from the Imperial Government.”109 It was this sympathy and sup-
port, in the end, that Duff had sought since as early as 1900.
Nevertheless, Duff’s story of victimization at the hands of govern-
ment represented only one perception of how andwhy events unfolded
as they did. In fact, the saga of the Duff Development Company was an
104. These events are summarized in TNA, CO 1073/133, memorandum, “His-
tory of the Affairs of the Duff Development Company 1900–March, 1923.”
105. For a summary of these negotiations, see “Duff Development Co., Ltd.,”
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (Weekly), November 13, 1926.
106. On these estimates, see the interview with John Walter Gregory in TNA,
FCO 141/16701, Arbitration.
107. OnMalaya’s railway system, see Fisher, “The Railway Geography of British
Malaya.”
108. By 1928, the company had 24,888 acres of rubber under cultivation. See
Kaur and Robert, “The Extractive-Colonial Economy and the Peasantry,” 44.
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object of fascination for a variety of outsiders during the late colonial
period, many of whom provided their own narratives about the com-
pany’s fate and what its history ultimately personified. Labeled an
“imperium in imperio,” the Duff concession—and particularly R. W.
Duff’s own “pioneering” story—was for some a symbol of the “romance
and adventure” that lay hidden on the imperial frontier as well as the
important role that businessmen played in revealing its secrets.110 For
others, the storywasmore complicated.Writing in 1912,ArnoldWright
and ThomasH. Reid believed that while Duff showed how “the spirit of
adventure which has stood our Empire in such good stead at different
periods of our history is still a living force,” such an achievement belied
the firm’s ultimate failure. This failure, they argued,was less an issue of
governmental overreach than it was a product of historical context and
circumstance. Because the company was a “modern Malayan proto-
type” of the “old trading company” of the nineteenth century, Wright
and Reid believed that its failure—or at the least, its confrontation with
the British government—was inevitable. With a tolerance for private
fiefdoms waning, Duff’s firm came up against a new and evolving
commercial landscape during the late colonial period, one that made
private and state interests interdependent and increasingly demanding
of compromise. The Duff Development Company, in other words, was
not the victim of a government conspiracy against big business. Instead,
it simply came of age at the wrong moment in history.111
Conclusion
The divergent fortunes of theDuff Development Company and theBurma
Corporation demonstrate how the relationship between the corporation
and the British colonial state transformed in the early twentieth century.
R. W. Duff, in an effort to protect his company’s rights at all costs, battled
with a successionof local administrative regimes over issues suchas taxes
and communications, a fact that ultimately impeded the firm’s progress.
The Burma Corporation, on the other hand, adapted. Although it initially
operated with considerable independence, the venture was gradually
encompassedwithin the broaderBritish colonial state–making apparatus,
allowing it to expand its industrial operations on a large scale. In both
cases, the colonial state loomed large.Whether through the control of land
and natural resources, the imposition of taxes, or the policing of bound-
aries and bodies, state support became critical to the expansion and
110. Duff Romance in Kelantan,” Malaya Tribune, June 21, 1947; “Mr. Duff of
Kalantan,” Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (Weekly), January
6, 1926.
111. Wright and Reid, The Malay Peninsula, 161.
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successof corporate interests in theBritishEmpireduring the late colonial
period, including in areas under indirect rule. These circumstances were
evenmore pronounced formining firms.With an overwhelming need for
manpower, land, energy, and communications, industrial mining com-
panies were especially reliant on the British administration to assist in
their development. As the saga of the Duff Syndicate demonstrates, how-
ever, not all private interests embraced this reality.
These facts make a comparative study between the Burma Corporation
and the Duff Development Company particularly revealing about the com-
plex relationshipmaintainedbetweenstateandprivate interests in theBritish
Empireduring the late colonial period.Despite operating inBritishSoutheast
Asia at the same historical moment and in areas similarly under indirect
colonial rule, the histories of these two firms demonstrate how a litany of
issues—from the vagaries of local administrators to the exact geographic
location of amineral deposit—could impact commercial success in the colo-
nial setting. Additionally, their stories show how the boundary between
corporate and governmental structures became increasingly unclear in the
early twentieth century. This understudied reality may have had broad con-
sequences across the British imperial world. While in the United States,
historians have focused considerable attention on the role of the corporation
as an agent of political change during the twentieth century, notions such as
“corporate liberalism” have received less deliberation in the context of the
British Empire.112 Nevertheless, the transnational corporation played a crit-
ical role in the expansion and governance of the empire. To succeed, these
corporations needed to work alongside and within existing British adminis-
trative power structures, making them increasingly reliant on the colonial
state. Power, though, worked both ways. To finance its empire, British offi-
cials often required thehelp of corporate enterprises to fulfill duties normally
reserved for government, particularly in borderland or frontier areas distant
from state control. These mutual interests brought the state and the corpora-
tion into closer contact during the late colonial period, presaging the turn
toward “economic development” in the mid-twentieth century.
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